Abstract

The Supreme Court of India’s 2023 decision in Supriyo Chakraborty v. Union of India marks a pivotal moment in the constitutional discourse on marriage equality and judicial restraint. This paper situates the judgment within the enduring jurisprudential conflict between liberal individualism and legal moralism, tracing its intellectual lineage to the Hart–Devlin debate that emerged from the 1957 Wolfenden Report in the United Kingdom. By drawing parallels between H.L.A. Hart’s emphasis on autonomy, privacy, and the harm principle, and Lord Devlin’s defence of societal morality and institutional preservation, the paper demonstrates how these competing philosophies manifest within the majority and minority opinions of the Supriyo verdict. The analysis argues that while the Court affirmed a Hartian conception of liberty by recognising the constitutional right of queer couples to form intimate relationships grounded in dignity and autonomy, it simultaneously adopted a Devlin-esque remedial restraint by refusing to extend legal recognition to same-sex marriages. The majority’s reliance on statutory interpretation, historical understandings of marriage, and the doctrine of separation of powers reflects a commitment to preserving social institutions through legislative rather than judicial change. In contrast, the minority opinions advocate a transformative constitutionalism that views equality and liberty as requiring positive legal recognition, including the proposal for civil unions. By examining this judicial compromise—described as a “Hartian right with a Devlin-esque remedy”—the paper highlights the unresolved tension between constitutional morality and societal morality in India’s evolving democratic framework. Ultimately, the study argues that Supriyo exemplifies the limitations of judicial liberalism in the face of entrenched social institutions, raising broader questions about whether constitutional courts should merely protect individual freedoms or actively reshape the moral framework of society in pursuit of substantive equality.

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