Execution Algorithm for Iterative Bidding and Vickrey Auction-based Mechanisms for Construction of Real Estate and Transferable Development Rights Exchange

  • Shubhada Subhash Patil
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  • Shubhada Subhash Patil

    Pursuing Ph.D. from Kirit P. Mehta School of Law, NMIMS, India

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Abstract

This paper presents an innovative execution algorithm for iterative bidding and Vickrey auction mechanisms in the Real Estate and Transferable Development Rights (TDR) exchange markets. By integrating economic principles, this model addresses the inefficiencies and speculative behaviors prevalent in traditional auction methods. The proposed algorithm enhances market transparency and efficiency by ensuring optimal resource allocation and aligning incentives for truthful bidding. The paper also discusses the regulatory frameworks, including government charges and FSI (Floor Space Index) calculations, that influence the TDR market. The results demonstrate the model's effectiveness in promoting sustainable urban development and reducing market disruptions. Future research directions include exploring the model's application in different regulatory environments and its long-term impact on market stability.

Type

Research Paper

Information

International Journal of Law Management and Humanities, Volume 7, Issue 4, Page 395 - 420

DOI: https://doij.org/10.10000/IJLMH.118003

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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution -NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits remixing, adapting, and building upon the work for non-commercial use, provided the original work is properly cited.

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