Abstract

Our legislators crafted the Indian Constitution and declared it to be the ultimate law of our nation in order to prevent any leadership from compromising the basic principles upon which India’s democracy was built. However, because the Constitution did not explicitly define the parameters of the Parliament’s modifying power, elected regimes routinely used this option to restrict people’s rights under Article 368 of the Constitution this abuse remained until the Indian Constitution took precedence over the amending powers of the Parliament when the Supreme Court held in “Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala (1973)” that Article 368 did not grant the Parliament the right to change the “Basic Structure of the Constitution” Following that ruling, the Basic Structure Doctrine has frequently been cited as a defence against the misuse of legislative powers by government apparatus in a number of political debates and judicial disputes. But how did this long and complicated journey result in the creation of the biggest safeguard of our Constitution against parliamentary powers? Furthermore, how exactly did this Doctrine serve its purpose? This paper examines the evolution of the Basic Structure Doctrine- right from the pre Kesavananda case position to the judgement day of that landmark case. It also analyses the further developments and usage of this Doctrine after 1973 towards becoming the pillar of our Constitution- a pillar which puts citizens’ rights and the idea of democracy over any government or legislator in the biggest democracy of the world.

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