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Critical Analysis on Theoretical Presuppositions on Terrorism and Failures of Counter Terrorism Techniques

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is an overall danger that makes an alarming sense of feeling even subsequent to hearing its name. There are bunches of suspicions and theories read to terrorism and counter-terrorism methods. Presumption either drives us to a strategy for checking out terrorism for great or, at times it makes a misguided judgment in the brain, which makes it harder to track down reasonable counter-terrorism procedures to battle terrorism. To comprehend the authenticity of this supposition, this paper will focus on two essential contextual investigations of the 9/11 attack and the Pulwama attack. Aside from that, this paper is furthermore going to discover the explanations for the non-adequacy of counter-terrorism techniques.

Keywords: terrorism, counter-terrorism, 9/11 attack, Pulwama attack, presumptions.

I. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a word with various implications relying on the individual and the setting of the utilization of this word. Terrorism is an overall acknowledged danger, which isn't that simple to characterize as there is still no such generally acknowledged definition accessible to this word. Because of the absence of an appropriate definition, it turns out to be truly hard to track down a close to a precise answer for this issue. As a result of which there are a few assumptions accessible with respect to terrorism. Suppositions like, terrorism benefits from overall acknowledgment as 'exceptional'; terrorism can be completely killed from the world by utilizing dangerous strategy, or only one out of every odd demonstration is a terrorist act.

Counter-terrorist strategies are the procedures that are utilized to control and end terrorism, but since the absence of an appropriate definition, how are we suppose to conclude it to terrorism? Counter-terrorism methods require a ton of exploration yet not having an appropriate definition, makes it hard to focus on one specific field. Separating terrorist acts from criminal acts based on the assumption of having a "reason" behind the demonstration is a simple mix-up, as each

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act has an explanation. Assuming about the 9/11 or Pulwama attack, the explanation for the two of them was retribution. So now as we realize that there was a 'purpose' for those demonstrations as well, is it still a terrorist act?

This paper will break down these inquiries in detail, alongside the purpose for the disappointment of counter-terrorism strategies followed by the USA after the 9/11 attack.

(A) Review Of Literature:

1. Step back: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy from the Failed War on Terror²-This paper is not limited to the set of experiences behind the 9/11 attack, but also the rundown of occasions that prompted the foundation of feelings of spite of Middle Eastern countries with the USA and Britain. It likewise gives the target behind the counter-terrorism techniques alongside the blunders in those goals which prompted the disappointment of those counterterrorism advances.
2. The Pulwama Attack: Significance, Implications and the Way Forward by Mohammed Sinan Siyech (case study)³:This paper depicts the 3 "R's" techniques, where they attempt to discover about thought process (reason) behind the attack, the renown, and the response after the attack. It likewise gives the effect of terrorism on an overall region.
3. The saint, the criminal and the terrorist: Towards a hypothesis on terrorism. Journal of Political Philosophy by Balagangadhara, S.N. and De Roover⁴: This paper discusses the underlying working of terrorism. How terrorism functions, and how they think about their criminal act as both good and supererogatory. This paper additionally accepts that terrorism benefits from the overall affirmation given to them by us by thinking or delegating them as uncommon or unique.

(B) Research Problem:

Terrorism is a global problem and there are continuo efforts from various governments and non-governmental agencies to curb this terrifying phenomenon. On the other hand, counter-terrorism efforts not only failed to reduce the terror problem but also fuelled more intense terrorism. A careful reading of existing research on terrorism suggests that presuppositions

² Thrall, A.T. and Goepner, E., Step back: lessons for US foreign policy from the failed war on terror. Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, 2017, (814). "<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep04912.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverage=false&addFooter=false>"

³ Gunaratna, R.O.H.A.N., OREG, A., WELLS, A., MITZCAVITCH, A. and ALKAFF, S.H., Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 2017."<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CTTA-April-2019.pdf>"

⁴ Balagangadhara, S.N. and De Roover, J' The saint, the criminal and the terrorist: Towards a hypothesis on terrorism. Journal of Political Philosophy', 18(1), pp.1-15, 2010. "https://www.academia.edu/download/14684622/balagangadhara_2009b.pdf"

behind counterterrorism policies are the major reason for the failure of anti-terrorism efforts. With this contradictory background, the paper will attempt to answer the following question.

(C) Research Question:

What factors affect the faulty presuppositions in relation to counter-terrorism policymaking?

(D) Objective:

- To understand the undercurrents of terrorism
- To analyze the presuppositions of counter-terrorism policies
- To find the reasons for the failure of anti-terrorism policies to curb terrorism.

(E) Hypothesis:

1. Hypothetical presuppositions make trouble in understanding terrorism plainly which makes it hard to make a powerful counter-terrorism strategy
2. The fundamental reason behind terrorist demonstrations is to acquire overall affirmation

(F) Coverage of scope:

This paper is mostly going to focus on demonstrating the legitimacy of hypothetical presupposition utilizing the contextual investigation of 9/11 and the Pulwama attack. Same contextual investigations will furthermore be utilized to demonstrate the explanation for the disappointment/failure of counter-terrorism methodologies

(G) Research Methodology

The methodology which this paper plans to follow is a doctrine kind of exploration methodology. This paper is additionally ping to basically investigate case studies to reach a resolution.

II. TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM

(A) “What is Terrorism?”:

Terrorism is a word that itself brings horrendous ghastliness among individuals. What we cannot deny is that they utilize criminal acts or untrustworthy acts to compromise, constrain, or coerce powerful individuals. The reason why terrorism is different from other criminal activities is because they believe their act to be unique and supererogatory. The meaning of terrorism explained in the United Kingdom terrorism act 2000 is practically like the definition utilized by

the USA⁵. Each nation has its own specific manner of characterizing terrorism; yet why? This is on the grounds that, there's no such universally concurred definition of terrorism.

It is a direct result of an absence of proper research. The motivation behind why a typical definition is significant is that it gives analysts a typical philosophy, a regular way to deal with accomplishing more viable examination. In view of the absence of an appropriate and regular definition, it turns out to be harder to react to terrorism on a global level. The motivation behind why the expression "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" actually survived is a result of its subversive nature. As we don't have a common and clear idea of what precisely terrorism is, a few nations attempt to battle it, and a few nations simply support it. Its own nature is to bite the hands of its own feeder and it's difficult to battle it independently, as a terrorist organization can be annihilated from one country yet it restructures itself in another, and then another, and this cycle goes on and on.

An ideal illustration of this would be the 9/11 attack. Prior to the attack, the USA and Pakistan were indulged in providing, emotional, monetary, along with military help to Taliban fighters; however, later after the 9/11 attack, they become the most noticeably terrible foes of one another. Thus, before the 9/11 attack, the USA never considered Taliban fighters as terrorists, yet later on, after the attack, it did. It's not on the grounds that they had comparable virtues around then, or on account of the really subversive nature of terrorism, but since the absence of legitimate information about it⁶.

Research is to some degree most significant device to control terrorism. Research can help us discover its conduct/design which will ultimately assist us with finding a remedy for this illness. However, till now for what reason would we say we aren't ready to discover something about it? This is a direct result of an absence of appropriate research. Research work on terrorism can be both troublesome and perilous.

On one hand, this sort of research isn't protected, like ones in Walk 2003, combat 18 (A neo-nazi extremist group) found the rundown of names of researchers from a college, and posted an

⁵ Silke, A, An introduction to terrorism research. Research on terrorism: trends, achievements and failures, pp.1-29, 2004 "https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Silke/publication/274389445_An_Introduction_to_Terrorism_Research/links/58b04566a6fdcc6f03f5fb88/An-Introduction-to-Terrorism-Research"

⁶ Balagangadhara, S.N. and De Roover, J., The saint, the criminal and the terrorist: Towards a hypothesis on terrorism. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 18(1), pp.1-15, 2010. "https://www.academia.edu/download/14684622/balagangadhara_2009b.pdf"

undermining post (on a similar site) suggesting that whoever goes to the connection will be considered as their "true enemy"⁷.

There are explicitly 3 sorts of danger that one can confront while doing research on terrorism, first is ambient danger (being in dangerous territory), situational danger (in view of circumstance) for example, accidentally inciting and so forth, and third is governmental clash. The initial two kinds of danger are misrepresented and over-exaggerated as the odds of making up for lost time in a circumstance like this are less, yet in the event if we talk about the third issue, the odds of getting involved with this are moderately more than the previous two options. Research work uncovers a ton about the governmental structure/framework. For instance, Lesley McCulloch was a writer and researcher who uncovered a ton of corruption and abuse cases inside Indonesian security by means of her article. So she was detained in 2002 for five months for "visa violation", yet it was generally seen as a path utilized by the government to stop her⁸.

(B) Theories and assumptions related to terrorism:

a. Assumption:1 “Terrorism Feed On The Achievement And Legitimacy It Appreciates By Our Acknowledgement Of Its Self-Depiction”⁹

As per S.N Bal Gangadhar terrorism¹⁰, the act establishes 4 sections

1. Legitimizing crime
2. Giving moral justification to their criminal act,
3. Considering their act as a supererogatory/loyal act,
4. Furthermore, ultimately benefiting from the overall affirmation of their self-portrayal/depiction.

They legitimize their wrongdoing by thinking about their act as unique and extraordinary. Their wrongdoing is viewed as extraordinary, simply by individuals who share similar moral grounds. They are just those individuals who can become terrorists who share a similar moral subject with one another. This makes their act both criminal and moral, at the same time. Criminal for the rest of the world and moral for their own community. This not just makes them resemble a

⁷ Silke, A. An introduction to terrorism research. *Research on terrorism: trends, achievements and failures*, pp.1-29, 2004. “ https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrew_Silke/publication/274389445_An_Introduction_to_Terrorism_Research/links/58b04566a6fdcc6f03f5fb88/An-Introduction-to-Terrorism-Research”

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Balagangadhara, S.N., *Terrorism: A Multinational with ‘Catholic’ Morality?*; “https://www.academia.edu/download/40527162/An_expanded_draft_on_Terrorism.pdf”

¹⁰ *ibid.*

moral agent yet makes their act look supererogatory. Their moral local communities change every now and then, as they crash into that one community who at that condo shared similar values with them and double-cross them quickly and join another community due to their actual subversive nature. He further concluded the paper by stating "*we allow terrorism to feed on the success and legitimacy it enjoys by our acceptance of its self-description*"¹¹

To analyze the importance of this supposition, the set of explanations and reasons behind the 9/11 attack will really be appropriate as the underlying foundations of the 9/11 attack, to dive exceptionally deep. Everything began during the 1990s when Britain began showing its inclusion in the middle eastern part of the world. It began after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 to make trade between India and Britain simpler. After that, a significant unforeseen development occurs with the disclosure of oil field zones in the Middle Eastern world in 1910, which Britain considered a chance to broaden its power over the Middle East so it could profit from oil fields which are essential for boats and industrial facilities.

The primary feelings of grades were expressed when promises were broken. England requested a guarantee from Arabs to battle against Turks and consequently, Britain will help at that point get their own single country. Middle Easterners kept their finish of the deal, yet Britain didn't, and broke its side of the deal in a peace conference, expressing that they'll coordinate Arabs lands into several parts and proclaiming that Arabs are not yet prepared to run all alone, rather Britain and France will lead them until they're prepared.

A similar guarantee was made with jews individuals, that the British government will help them get their country back, yet it was a procedure to acquire support from the Jewish community during war emergencies. Breaking the finish of the deal with the Jews community later transformed into a strained circumstance where the Jews and Palestinians weren't prepared to impart the land to one another. To determine this contention UNO partitioned the spot into two, one for each. Palestinians disagreed with the split, but jews did, which further gave the world another country, I.e. Israel (on 14 May 1948), and the USA turned into the best ally of Israel.

The next event was Israel's refusal on giving back the land which he gained during the war with Arabs in 1948, 1967, and 1973. This even prompted the development of PLO (Palestinian freedom association), and the start of terrorist plotting against the USA. This was also when OSAMA BIN LADEN, called for a jihadi movement against their actual enemies ie the USA and Israel. The following occasion was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan where bin Laden and different Afghani fighters approached and battled against Russians. After which bin Laden

¹¹ *ibid.*

shaped the "AL-QAEDA" group. This was the point at which he began sending suicide attacks on Lebanon and Somalia.

Bin Laden also showed his reasonable feelings of resentment toward the USA during a secretly conducted interview where he said:

“Remember how the United States rushed out of Somalia in shame and disgrace.”

“We believe that the worst thieves in the world today are the Americans. We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets ...¹²”

In the wake of examining the set of experiences just as the arrangement of occasions which set off the 9/11 attack, it's truly hard to accept that the attack was made to acquire overall affirmation, all things being equal, it shows that one of the primary explanation for the attack was outrage and the drawn-out feelings of resentment with The USA.

b. Assumption.2: “Not Every Act Be Considered A Terrorist Act”

This suspicion gives a straightforward circumstance and investigation that “not every act be considered as a terrorist act” However how would we separate between those triumph acts? What is the distinction between a simple criminal act and a terrorist act? is it true that we are assumed to separate these acts based on having any secret political plan, or to take the assistance of dread and alert among individuals to fill their needs? By adding a layer of having a predominant rationale, or an explanation for a terrorist act, at that point how's it not the same as a criminal act, as those acts likewise have some intention, some plan.

The principal distinction between a criminal act and a terrorist act is that the expectation and thought process behind the terrorist acts are to make a feeling of fear or to give a wide threatening impact. The facts confirm that few out of every odd act is a terrorist act, but since the absence of a properly formulated definition, listing which acts should be considered as terrorist acts, it's hard to distinct between terrorist acts and criminal acts. The equivalent was expressed by Weinberg et that:

“unless we are willing to label as terrorism a very wide range of violent activities, we may be better off finding another governing concept or looking elsewhere for a definition.¹³”

¹² What caused 911? (version A); Enquiry 2: “out of the blue”: when did 9/11 begin?. <https://bep.education/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/34-Since-911-Enquiry-2-When-did-911-begin-What-caused-911-Version-A.pdf>

¹³ Richards, A... Conceptualizing terrorism.OUP Oxford.Chapter 5 “three preliminary Assumptions when approaching the conceptualisation of terrorism”, 2015, <https://www.google.co.in/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=2ahUKEwjOwtmNztbvAhVYIbcAHTqcA6EQFjABegQIBBAD&url=https%3A%2F%2Frepository.uel.ac.uk%2Fdownload%2Fde83d1c5334cae762396d64ca24774bc207101dd824721aa413328ac6606bde3%2F524233%2FRichardsConceptualizingTerrorismChapter%25205.pdf&usq=AOvVaw2jvRk6adxmqr8nH2x6LPZx>

For this current assumption, we should simply take the Pulwama attack into consideration. This attack happened on 14 February 2019 in Kashmir. In this attack, 40 members of the CRPF (central reserve police force) were slaughtered by a suicide bomber. This attack made a ton of war pressure between India and Pakistan. The Pakistani association behind this attack was Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM).

As per Louise Richardson¹⁴, the most ideal approach to comprehend a terrorist attack is by utilizing the 3 'R' procedure, i.e. revenge, renown, and reaction.

- **Revenge:**

The purpose of the Pulwama attack was

1. The suicide bomber needed to fight back with the Indian armed force as he was once captured by the Indian army and was tormented by them- as expressed by his father during an interview.
2. Another explanation was murdering JeM's chief's child. He was murdered during a gunfight with Indian forces.

Gatherings and thoughts like these exploited individuals who as of now have some close-to-home feelings of resentment with another foe country. Additionally with the confirmation of getting resumption after death, they get inclined towards jihadi belief system.

- **Renown:**

The motivation behind 'renown' is gathering attention. Organizations like these demonstrate forcefully when their requests are overlooked by worldwide networks. To draw their attention they lead attacks like this to recover their attention. In the Pulwama attack, the recording of the impact alongside the JeM's confrontation of the attack was delivered online via social media destinations to draw however much consideration as could be expected. Most of the time, there are extra secret intentions behind them, as everybody knows about the post-Pulwama attack circumstance when India and Pakistan were on the desire of proclaiming battle against one another. This attack can some way or another additionally be considered as a strategy to build the radiance between India and Pakistan to a limit level.

- **Reaction:**

The reaction to this attack was that India dispatched an airstrike on the JeM's camps arranged

¹⁴ Gunaratna, R.O.H.A.N., OREG, A., WELLS, A., MITZCAVITCH, A. and ALKAFF, S.H., Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses. 2017 "https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/CTTA-April-2019.pdf"

in Pakistan. This additionally demonstrates that this even prompted a horror climate of dreading another nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Here in the setting with this assumption, the Pulwama terrorist attack shows that the association did have the aim of making a startling effect, needed to draw global consideration and spur individuals, as in Kashmir individuals began chanting suicide bombers as martyrs/a saint which assists them with selecting more individuals in their association and their unrivalled intention was revenge just as making warlike circumstance among India and Pakistan.

(C) Why aren't counter-terrorism techniques working?

To comprehend a better viewpoint of the non-adequacy of counter-terrorism techniques, let us again consider the counter-terrorism methods utilized after the 9/11 attack to whelp out terrorism. The procedures which were utilized by the USA were a very remarkable disappointment.

a. Rationalist approach:

In the 9/11 attack, when al-Qaida was arranging the attack, the rationalist approach was to a greater extent an unbiased methodology. We can't think about it as a careful fruitful or a bombed approach, as it took care of the job at some level of the circle. In the rationalist approach, they go through more cash on fortifying the military, air terminal security, against terrorism innovations, and so forth The USA nearly spent \$72 billion every year to fortify something very similar. The realist approach additionally incorporates removing a wide range of monetary help, to drape terrorists out to dry so they can't arrange some other terrorist attack.

Another motivation behind why this starter was halfway fruitful, is a result of the understanding of the right value rise strategy. As indicated by Enders and Sandler,

“maximize utility or expected utility obtained from the consumption of basic commodities, produced from terrorist and non-terrorist activities¹⁵”

This implies that by removing their monetary backing and by improving our safety efforts, marked down terrorist associations' monetary utilization abilities, which is like the value rise strategy where an increase in the general cost of a good, purpose decreases, by and large, utilization interest of a similar decent. Here value rise would be considered as the cost or the measure of cash utilized by the public authority to fortify the safety efforts, which caused a decline in "consumption in use" by the terrorist groups.

¹⁵ Spencer, A.,. The problems of evaluating counter-terrorism. Revista UNISCI, (12), pp.179-201. 2006
“<https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/767/76701212.pdf>”

- Disappointment in anticipating the attack:

The motivation behind why the 9/11 attack was effective is that this attack was a blend of persistence just as scholarly information set up. Nobody at any point envisioned that the motivation behind why Al-Qaeda was unexpected, as no one imagined that they were arranging something truly gigantic. Al-Qaeda needed to make this so capricious that as opposed to sending self-destruction aircraft, or a bio-attack all things being equal, Al-Qaeda chose to send plane hijackers. prior everybody used to accept that "*Terrorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and not a lot of people dead*¹⁶". But the 9/11 attack refuted everybody. It was additionally a direct result of the person who was driving the Al-Qaeda bunch, as Osama Bin Laden was not simply a simple ignorant terrorist, all things considered, he was a graduate with an economics and public administration degree.

b. American destructive approach:

It was a totally terrible experience felt by the USA concerning the 9/11 attack. America needed involvement in handling circumstances like this. Instead of rebuffing just the al-Qaeda group, the USA chose to obliterate terrorist groups on a worldwide level. Doing that depicted that America is announcing a worldwide conflict against terrorism which ended up being a demonstration of purposelessness. Regardless of whether we read about it ever, obliterating all the terrorist groups is definitely not a perpetual arrangement, rather than it's a method of extending the conflict against them to a far past. Even subsequent to obliterating those terrorist associations, it didn't totally kill terrorism from the world. What's more, one can't totally annihilate terrorism regardless of whether we use trillions of cash to fortify the security administrations, or by again adopting a destructive strategy.

Additionally, another issue with the technique was the motivation behind why the Middle East had feelings of resentment toward the USA as a result of their ruling and double-crossing history. For the center eastern they aren't comprising or getting ready for a terrorist attack, however, for them, it's to a greater extent a battle for their opportunity and their grudges against the USA.

What's more, by making its military powers interceding in the center eastern world, alongside the reliable endeavor to oversee them by invading Afganistan and Iraq, and drone strikes, target

¹⁶ Hoffman, B. Rethinking terrorism and counterterrorism since 9/11. *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 25(5), pp.303-316, 2002. "<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/105761002901223>"

murdering, aggravated things¹⁷.

III. CONCLUSION

Counter-terrorism methodologies can't be outlined based on simple suppositions or based on their past attacks or by essentially following destructive systems. To counter terrorism, there's an immense necessity for profound and exhaustive examination. One can't battle terrorism, without appropriately thinking or knowing about it. The information accessible about terrorism on the web or with the public authorities is based on their past attack records, which isn't sufficient.

The destructive methodology is additionally impossible to battle terrorism on a long-term premise as these gatherings can't be eliminated just by doing military attacks or essentially by obliterating their headquarters, as there's a likelihood that there may be some different associations too that are covered up. Likewise, destructive methodology someplace propels others to join their gathering. This likewise slants their suppositions to begin having faith in a jihadi belief system.

In the event, we cannot completely foresee all the steps and efforts taken by the government to curb this issue, as some of them had an enormous success rate, but to battle terrorism on a drawn-out promise, there's a tremendous need to conduct more exploration and research.

¹⁷ Thrall, A.T. and Goepner, E.. Step back: lessons for US foreign policy from the failed war on terror. Cato Institute, Policy Analysis, (814), 2017. "<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep04912.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false>"

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